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Abstract 
The original signatory states to the Treaty of Rome had formally committed 
themselves to policies of liberalisation by implementing mutual recognition in 
the sector of professional services by the end of the twelve year transition 
period. In fact, the process took much longer and the freedom of services im-
plemented in the early 1990s affected professional services in various forms 
and different degrees. 
Business consulting is an industry with a tradition of rather low degree of 
market regulation in all European countries. However, it is indirectly affected by 
a high level of regulation in neighbouring fields of business services and in 
some of the fields where they have developed special consulting expertise. As a 
consequence re-regulations of these branches do have an impact on the con-
sultants’ business as well. 
There is a wide agreement in the political and scientific debates over the 
shift of decision making arenas and powers from the national to the suprana-
tional and from the public to the private sector. We argue that business asso-
ciations and large companies can be regarded as co-responsible for the in-
creasing impact of supranational institutions on the sectoral governance. 
Based on the analysis of documents and on expert interviews in Brussels 
and in Germany (with representatives of associations and companies) we will 
highlight the need for differentiation among professions (and would be-profes-
sions) and concerning groups of organisations (associations and companies). 
Key words: European integration, re-regulation, multi-level governance, busi-
ness consultants, associations. 
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1 Introduction: European institutionalisation and suprana-
tional governance*
Building on the single market program, the EU treaties of Maastricht (1993) and 
Amsterdam (1998) again changed the institutional configuration of European 
governance affecting business organisations and business associations in 
supranational, if diverse and fragmented, ways. Thence the balance between 
European intergovernmentalism and supranational multi-level decision making 
in the European Union has been further shifted to the latter mode of govern-
ance. The supranational arenas and administrative organisations of Europe’s 
peculiar multi-level institutional arrangement as well as its (legislative) output 
have become indispensable for a majority of business branches and individual 
companies. Beate Kohler-Koch (1999) has proposed the term „supranational 
network governance“ to study the specific transformation of intensive pub-
lic/private governance in Europe. Scholars working in the tradition of historical 
institutionalism have recognized the loosening and/or transformation of the pre-
viously close institutional knit at the national level, albeit varieties of capitalism 
are found to predominantly persist. International or supranational institutions are 
hold responsible for a general reduction of institutional impact on business or-
ganisation and co-ordination. 
In an attempt to understand dynamics of international institutions and or-
ganisations more positively, recent work focused on standardisation processes 
promoted in diverse international arenas (Morgan, 2001). European integration 
scholars find increasing supranational problem solving capacities in a variety of 
policy areas (Scharpf, 1997). Moreover, regulatory competition (Heritier, 
et al. 1994) between national approaches at the supranational European level is 
suggested to result in mechanisms of national regulatory reproduction at the 
supranational level. Certainly one of the central features of Europe’s multi-level 
institutional arrangement is the nestedness of supranational institutions in na-
tional institutions (Aspinwall, 1999), though the interrelation is subject of change 
due to institutional rearrangements at both national and supranational levels. 
More generally, however, little headway has been made hitherto with re-
gard to differing international institutional impact due to variations in institutional 
densities of international regimes such as the World Trade Organisation or the 
International Labour Organisation on the one hand (almost strictly intergovern-
mental organisations) and regional integration regimes established to more 
profoundly transform participating societies and business systems such as 
NAFTA and, most prominently, the European Union on the other hand. We are 
arguing here that supranational integration regimes are institutional arrange-
ments deliberately designed to and in the case of the European Union capable 
of a far more pro-active promotion of institutional change at the domestic level, 
and of supranational institutionalisation with further reaching implications for 
organisations, i.e. beyond limiting the range of options for conduct and co-ordi-
nation. Furthermore, European supranational institutions appear to develop 
capabilities over time which have consequences beyond original intentions of 
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the powers creating them (as e.g. the European Court of Justice). Over time 
then, contextual rationalities of interest representation of wide varieties of public 
and private actors in Europe’s unique multi-level polity are changing due to in-
stitutional change and supranational institutionalisation. 
There is a wide agreement over the shift of decision making arenas and 
powers from the national to the supranational and from the public to the private 
sector. The latter has been recognized long to play a strong role in the supra-
national arena, e.g. due to the lack of resources of the agenda setting European 
Commission eagerly inviting resources and cross national input (most notably 
from business associations) to build up cases for transnational integration 
(Cowles, 2001). Vice versa, the European Roundtable of Industrialists in par-
ticular is seen as having a strong influence on the Commission agenda with re-
gard to the single market project, Trans European Network developments, R&D 
politics etc. (Holman, 2000). Business associations and large companies thence 
can be regarded co-responsible for the increasing impact of supranational in-
stitutions on association governance, and on individual organisations. Table 1 
shows  the components of European supranational institutional arrangements 
and their changing impact. 
Table 1: EU-institutional arrangement: changes over time 
Supranational institutional-
ised arrangement 
Original mode of influence Mode of influence devel-
oped in 1990s 
European Court of Justice parallel supranational normative supranational (since 
1960s) 
Council of Ministers unanimous decision making majority voting in single mar-
ket and many other fields 
(since 1980s) 
European Commission agenda setting agenda setting reinforced by 
other treaty based powers 
(competition authority), and 
intensified public private co-
operation 
European Parliament consulting and limited con-
trol of Commission 
co-decision and increasing 
control of Commission (since 
1990s) 
Economic and Social Com-
mittee 
consulting consulting 
Committee of Regions non existing consulting 
Private interest governments supranational federation 
consulting 
supranational network govern-
ance participation (since 
1980s) 
In a summary article on the role of business in European integration, Justin 
Greenwood (2000) argues this twofold impact of European institutions:  
– Firstly, European decision making transforms systems of interest 
representation of business associations (complementing domestic govern-
ance with supranational governance).  
– Secondly, supranational regulatory power directly and indirectly (with na-
tional institutional intermediation) impacts on individual organisations. 
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European regulations proposed by the Commission and decided by the 
Council of Ministers immediately become national law without further inter-
ference by national legislatures whereas European directives establish hard 
law frameworks which leave space for country specific adaptation.1  
Greenwood’s twofold impact statement (transformation of private interest 
governments and regulatory impact on organisations) is fair in general, how-
ever, it is opening room for a wide array of research questions due to the mixed 
characteristics of Europe’s institutional arrangements and due to the uneven 
process of Europeanisation. Neither is the transformation of association 
governance in Europe universal across industries (Greenwood, 1998), nor can 
European regulatory impact on organisations be considered homogeneous 
overall. Flexibilities and ambiguities can be determined with regard to countries 
(participating in some aspects of integration and opting out of others; imple-
menting and policing supranational regulations more or less faithfully), with 
regard to sectors and horizontal policies (uneven targeting of industries e.g. with 
regard to single market politics, unwillingness, or inability, or limited ability to 
cover certain policy areas, in particular areas with strong redistribution effects), 
and even with regard to individual companies or organisations (e.g. an antitrust 
case singling out one company). Given the unequal impact of Europe’s institu-
tional arrangement by default and/or by design, it is clear that supranational in-
stitutional impact creates stronger or weaker „adaptation pressures“ in the 
domestic arena (Cowles/Caporaso/Risse, 2001) requiring systematic compara-
tive research efforts to analyse varieties of European institutional fragmentation 
of business associations and firms. Among the important public and private 
variables to be considered, the distribution of power across the multi-level ar-
rangement, the strength or weakness of domestic institutional persistence, the 
combination and relative weight of powers in favour of European transformation, 
and the structure of industries may all have to be considered. 
As a first analytical tool, we propose a simple typology designed to distin-
guish between predominantly intergovernmental modes of European govern-
ance (multi-national Europe: lower impact) and stronger supranational multi-
level modes (supra-/transnational Europe: stronger impact) and between in-
dustries/policy fields characterised by lower and higher degrees of institutional 
regulation and state intervention. 
In this paper I discuss just one service industry, business consulting. Busi-
ness consulting is an industry with a rather low degree of market regulation. The 
market for business consulting, however, is indirectly affected by a high degree 
of regulation in neighbouring fields of business transactions, namely profes-
sional services dominated at the national level by high degrees of private in-
terest government regulation reinforced by legal market protection (legal ser-
vices, accounting services etc.). 
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Table 2: Impact of European governance on business associations and 
organisations 
European governance 
  
Industry/horizontal policy 
Multi-national mode : pre-
dominantly intergovern-
mental 
Supra-/transnational mode: 
multi-level mix with strong 
elements of supranational 
authority 
weak regulatory charac-
teristics 
Private interest governance 
(PIG): no or low supranational 
impact: weak or no European 
associations. 
 
no or little regulatory impact 
on organisations (only hori-
zontal) 
PIG: limited supranational 
impact: some development of 
supranational associations 
 
limited regulatory impact 
(mostly horizontal and indirect)
strong regulatory character-
istics 
PIG: limited supranational 
impact (lowest common 
denominator) 
weak European associations 
(federations of national asso-
ciations) 
 
little direct and horizontal 
regulation of organisations 
PIG: strong supranational im-
pact: stronger European 
orientations of associations. 
 
Stronger impact of direct and 
horizontal regulation of 
organisations 
European policies aimed at cross border market integration since the 
establishment of the European Communities in 1957 (treaty of Rome). Mutual 
recognition of professional qualifications was to open markets for cross border 
activities within a 12 year period. However, rather little progress on the forma-
tion of a single European market was to be observed until the 1980s. In profes-
sional services, the Commission worked for decades predominantly with na-
tional domestic private interest groups to positively establish common European 
rules for cross national market entry in individual professional services (de-
grees, qualifications etc.). Frustrated by protracted national protectionism, the 
Commission finally decided in the 1980s to sideline national associations and 
private interest governments. The newly developed horizontal approach in pro-
fessional services eventually forced mutual recognition on all services (except 
legal and medical services). The new approach can be regarded as a shift from 
multi-domestic harmonization to supranational multi-level politics primarily pro-
moting market integration. 
Concerning the Europeanisation of association activities in professional and 
consulting services, we expected a rather weak trend resulting more from a 
changing logic of influence in neighbouring markets. A shift from multi-national 
modes of governance to supra-/transnational modes is expected to lead to a 
transformation of private interest involvement and, subsequently, in a higher 
supranational regulatory impact on organisations (changing logics of influence). 
Higher supranational regulatory impact on organisations in turn is likely to rein-
force private interest activities (e.g. due to changing logics of membership in 
business associations). Such an intensifying spiral movement can be regarded 
as a key ingredient for further supranational institutionalisation processes 
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eventually further transforming common practices of organisations and associa-
tions, if in diverse and fragmented ways.2
2 Business Interest Representation at European Level 
Businesses in different industries develop quite specific relations with the 
system of political institutions depending on 
– the key characteristics of significant industry markets (e.g. predominantly 
private transactions versus strong impact of institutionalised regulation; 
short time versus long time planning; cyclical versus stable; local versus 
international, etc.), 
– the composition of an industry (predominantly SME; mix of smaller and 
larger; large companies only etc.), and 
– the immediate importance of political regulation for market transactions. 
If markets are predominantly local, regional or national at best, a lack of signifi-
cant regulation of business transactions characterizes company relations, and 
firms are predominantly small or medium sized, companies have few incentives 
to invest resources at the supranational or international level. If key character-
istics of markets are transnational, instead, and involve a high degree of institu-
tionalised control (e.g. by law and direct government intervention), political 
communication of companies and business associations can be regarded a de-
cisive (strategic) element of corporate coordination and success, eventually. In 
view of these characteristics, European professional services are clearly distinct 
cases. The business consulting industry relies on private business contracts 
mainly although the public sector increasingly is developing into an attractive 
market for some consultancies, and exhibits a certain resilience against political 
internationalisation via business associations. However, while a dominance of 
SMEs in business consulting at domestic levels can be observed, this domi-
nance is highly qualified due to a small number of (pre-dominantly Anglo-
Saxon) diversified global business consulting firms (frequently combining con-
sulting services with other professional services such as accounting etc.) pro-
viding for a solid dual structure in this service industry.  
2.1 Business Consultancy: Europeanisation limited and yet 
significant 
„Professional services were … the only area of economic activity where the 
original signatory states to the Treaty of Rome had formally committed them-
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selves to implementing mutual recognition by the end of the twelve year transi-
tional period laid down in the Treaty“ (Lovecy, 1999: 135, emphasis added). In 
practise, it has necessitated a much longer struggle reaching a decisive phase 
with the arrival of the single market project. 
The relevance of interest mediation via associations cannot be defined in a 
general way for professional services because of the segmentation of the com-
pany structures. This holds particularly for business consultancies where the 
trend towards internationalisation of relevant markets combined with the pres-
sure for growth strategies are promoting segmentation of the branch structure. 
Three segments can be clearly identified in all EU-countries: the top group of 
the big multinational companies, a substantial group of medium size firms of 
national and international origin and the vast majority of small and very small 
firms with local or regional reach only. It is before all the second group for which 
the liberalisation of markets poses problems. They have traditionally taken most 
advantage out of protected national markets and feel threatened by increased 
competition from abroad. This is why they may tend to take recourse to lobbying 
via federations on the national and - depending on the issues - European levels. 
In contrast, market liberalisation is conforming to the interests of big firms which 
are anyway operating on an international scale. As a rule, the big players do not 
see the need for organizing in an association the less so as they would have to 
accept compromises in order to define common targets with smaller firms. 
Taking into account this structural configuration Greenwood’s (1998) results 
of a comparative study on collective action in the European Union are no sur-
prise. He has documented that associations representing the professions 
formed later, and came to Brussels later, than did business groups. Moreover, 
the patterns of European collective action in the domains of the professions are 
characterised as fragmented, poorly resourced and of limited influence. As a 
major indicator of lacking relevance, Greenwood (ibid.,: 136) is pointing to the 
fact that the „intersectoral European-level organisations representing the pro-
fessions were either not in existence or not consulted“ when the Commission 
was drafting the framework for the freedom to provide services: The general 
system directives of 1989 and 1992 which re-regulated key issues regarding the 
free movement of professional workers. 
Lovecy points to the specific features of market-closure and market-seg-
mentation around which the profession’s project has been constructed and 
which have constituted a major challenge to the European regional market inte-
gration project (Lovecy, 1999: 142). Professional associations represent par-
ticularistic forms of private interest government enjoying a range of powers 
allowing closed shop policies in both arm’s length and co-ordinated business 
systems although with considerable cross-national, as well as cross-profes-
sional, differences. The general directives mentioned above have constituted a 
sea-change in the approach of the Commission with the aim of liberalising the 
professional sector. After years of difficult and cumbersome deliberations for 
passing measures to enable specific professionals to practice in another EU 
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country this sectoral approach was abandoned. The new strategy designed 
general directives requiring the mutual recognition of qualifications and diplo-
mas encompassing the entire constituency of professions (excluding the health-
related services and legal services). As the collective organisations of the pro-
fessions are also the arenas for conflicts between ‘neighbouring’ professions 
over market boundary issues, changes of the context may also affect these 
power relations. „In contrast, the Treaty’s market integration objectives have in-
volved disaggregating such profession specific clusters at the national level, 
and replacing them at EC level by a quite different pattern of aggregation, on a 
cross-professional and cross-state sector-wide basis, around discrete policy 
issues such as Europe-wide mobility and competition“ (Lovecy, 1999: 147). 
The sector-wide applicability of professional mobility came in the wake of 
the intergovernmental ‘package-deal’ agreement of the Single European Act 
(SEA) and adoption of the Internal Market Programme. As the SEA had intro-
duced majority rules in the Council, DG III was able to manage the preparatory 
phase for the directives in a way that cut across the separate arenas of private 
interest governments within the member states thereby excluding national pro-
fessional associations and the comparatively weak European federations of na-
tional professions, too (ibid.,: 149). Thus, this exclusion is not only indicative of 
the relative weakness of these organisations at the European level - as Green-
wood (1998) assumes - but the manifestation of a governance transformation 
indicating the institutional weight of the emergent European regulatory state 
(Lovecy, 1999). 
EU level institutions succeeded in changing the rules of the game of trans-
national market access. Within each member state, new co-ordinating agencies 
open for individual applicants had to be designated with a sector-wide remit 
parallel to EC’s own pattern of policy sectoralisation. Moreover, within each 
member states’ Permanent Representation a desk-officer had to be established 
dealing with issues of professional mobility also on a sector-wide basis. Thus, 
because of the general system directives national institutions and organisations 
have to at least act on European institutional requirements. 
Greenwood’s argument of limited internationalisation concerning the rele-
vance of national differences in the composition of professional interests and 
their relationship with the state (Greenwood, 1998: 147), however, is opening 
up terrain for analysis with regard to cross national strategies. Whereas some 
professions in some countries clearly feel threatened by European level chal-
lenges to their control capacity, for others the European level change is per-
ceived to open up chances to circumvent national barriers abroad. More favour-
able starting positions as a result of the EU general service directives can be 
expected for those groups (and their organisations) which are struggling for 
their status vis-à-vis professions with established market monopolies. This is 
the case for business consultants „squeezed in“ between the legal and ac-
counting professions which are strongly protected in all European countries.3 
Business consultants have not attained the status of a traditional profession in 
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any European country. They have taken steps to substitute the missing legal 
shelter by initiatives both at company level and by association activities. And in-
creasingly so at the European level. 
2.2 Consulting Associations at European Level: Contextual 
Rationalities of Firms of Small and Medium Size 
While we have argued that the logic of negative integration of EU is of limited 
direct relevance for business consultancies it is not without impact. The spec-
trum of associations in the sector of business consultancy has exhibited dyna-
mism particularly in the 1990s - which means in the wake of the Internal Market 
project. 
There are three European-level associations claiming to represent pan-
sectoral professional interests: 
– SEPLIS, representing the liberal professions, was formed in 1974 already; 
– EUROCADRES (Council of European Professional and Managerial Staff) 
seeks to group together unionised professional and managerial staff and 
was created in 1993; 
– CEC (Confédération Européenne des Cadres) representing salaried 
managerial staff primarily in industry and commerce; was started in 1989. 
All three have only limited resources, yet, they are not cooperating with each 
other. Only the second and the third organisation are officially recognised as a 
(second level) social partner. Their late and reluctant activities in the European 
arenas are related to their sceptical position concerning the perspective of mar-
ket liberalisation (Greenwood, 1998). 
In the meantime, services have moved to the front and centre of the trade 
policy stage of WTO/Uruguay Round, too. This horizontal approach comprises 
all tradable services including the range of professional and business services - 
heavily or lightly regulated (Kakabadse, 1995). To cope with strong U.S. pres-
sures, European Commissioner Pascal Lamy activated European service busi-
ness groups to create a business forum supplying the Commission with input for 
the negotiations. The task was taken on by a British banker who in April 1999 
created the European Services Forum (ESF) to provide for the single European 
interlocutor of the services industries (Interview with Pascal Kerneis, Brussels, 
02.03.01). The aim is to defend the interest of European services industry to-
wards the GATS negotiations in WTO. The composition of the members of ESF 
(the CEOs of 45-50 large companies in Europe and 35 trade associations) is 
reflecting the philosophy: On the one hand the personal connections of the 
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CEOs to the highest political national level should be instrumental, on the other 
hand a broad representation of exporting services was stipulated.4
ESF has adopted two basic principles when taking position papers: To con-
centrate on horizontal issues and to not work on a consensus basis. However, 
the key of success for EFS’s mandate will be the work on domestic regulations, 
i.e. binding agreements on non-discrimination of foreign services suppliers. 
Professional services and particularly business consultancies are well repre-
sented in ESF. A major problem to be solved is the divergence of interest be-
tween the big companies and the trade associations who are supposed to 
represent all the members - also the large majority of small and medium seize 
companies. Thus, the basic structural divide at the national level is reproduced 
at the transnational level. 
Concerning the sector of business consultancies, FEACO, a federation of 
national associations, has been established at the European level already in 
1960, for a long time serving mainly as a loose forum. It was not by chance but 
precisely in view of the implementation of the Internal Market that the office was 
transferred from Paris to Brussels in 1991. In the meantime, the membership 
has grown to 23 national associations. The main objectives of the federation are 
encouraging transnational networking by members, keeping a watching brief 
over the image of industry, and maintaining a relationship with the EC and other 
pan-European organisations.5 The basic governance principle is „one country 
one vote“. Yet, the UK, Germany and France are clearly the most important 
members because of the volume of their markets for consultancy services. They 
can afford to generously subsidise the FEACO office and they are continuously 
represented in the executive committee (consisting of eight members - in prin-
ciple on a rotating basis). 
FEACO has initiated several issue working groups in 1996 with the aim to 
raise interest of members of national associations:  
– Working group „Small Tops“ offers networking for small and medium size 
companies; 
– the European Multinational Forum is a platform for big internationally active 
consulting firms (which are not easily engaged); 
– working group „Relationship with European Commission“ forms a basis 
both for information and lobbying concerning business with the European 
Commission (sponsored consulting programmes and contracts given by 
EC). 
The topics of the working groups are reflecting both the persistent cleavages 
inherent in the structure of membership and the increasing importance of insti-
tutional change at the European level. 
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Apart from the organisations of interest mediation on the EU level just de-
scribed, there are a number of nationally based associations in the sector of 
business consultancy services which increasingly deal with European issues 
directly (Theobald, 2001; Rudolph/Padmanabhan, 2001). Germany’s BDU pro-
vides one example for the stepping up of European activities. The Bundesver-
band Deutscher Unternehmensberater (BDU), the largest and most influential 
national association, is also the German representative in FEACO. Thanks to 
this constellation, the BDU can take advantage - alternatively or in combination 
- of national and European channels for information and lobbying activities. The 
considerable amount of resources that the BDU is prepared to sponsor for the 
functioning of FEACO is indicative of the relevance of the European agenda. 
One major hope is that the liberalisation trends characteristic for the Internal 
Market will contribute to an erosion of the regulations privileging the law profes-
sion in Germany which are said to be particularly strong. Thus, developments at 
the transnational level are taken as arguments for lobbying on the national level 
in order to improve the relative competitive position for business consultancies.  
Obviously, changes of associations at the European level can be taken as 
an indicator that at least some groups have felt the need to refocus their instru-
ments for information and lobbying. Moreover, in the service sector and in 
especially in professional services, the panorama of interest representation at 
the EU level has been and is reshaped by the influence of larger companies in 
particular. The format of ESF (sketched above) includes the double representa-
tion of firms and associations, a structure backed by the twofold need of high 
level company input as well as the representation of broad interests. The Euro-
pean services association FEACO, a traditional association of associations, 
lately has considered individual membership for large companies, too (provided 
that they are member in at least five national associations!). Association activi-
ties in business consulting thence can be considered to predominantly reflect 
contextual problems of the medium sized and larger companies not capable to 
climb up to the global competitors, whereas European level arenas and institu-
tions are providing for an increasing relevance to open up business in 
neighbouring market segments.  
2.3 Supranational Politics as Strategic Management of Large 
Companies: Regulation of Customer Markets 
As stated above, business consultancies have traditionally been a branch with-
out hardly any specific political regulation. As a consequence, the implementa-
tion of the Common Market does not imply major changes that might fuel sub-
stantial reappraisals. However, the dynamics of evolving governance structures 
at European level together with the increasing complexity of international eco-
nomic transactions may be a seedbed for new opportunity structures. Again, 
these chances are not equally open to all business consultancy firms alike. The 
big or even very big ones will be privileged - in the end at least. 
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Since the mid 1990s large European firms are not only „going global“ in 
their market operations, but in their political realm as well. The Transatlantic 
Business Dialogue (TABD) is the most outstanding example of this develop-
ment. Among the factors backing up this change was the growing realisation of 
government officials that they were ill-equipped to manage the global economic 
developments without a „dialogue“ with companies. 
The TABD is an important arena promoting regulatory change in Europe 
and North America. Much like the European Service Forum sketched above, it 
displays a very strong involvement of large consultancy firms. The latter are 
most eager to support certain business issue groups lobbying for regulatory and 
other change. This is the case in logistics, for example. Consultancies are an 
active ingredient in both the Supply Chain Council (driven by industrial firms) 
and the Efficient Consumer Response Council (ECR, driven by commercial 
capital). Both groups are actively promoting regulatory change in Europe and 
North America to rationalize logistics operations across borders. When Euro-
pean Logistics Association (ELA), a European association of national federa-
tions of logistics professionals, invited large companies to register at the Euro-
pean association level directly, the only companies following the call were two 
big consultancy firms (Plehwe/Vescovi, 2000). 
The supranational level of the European polity has a significant impact on 
consulting companies in yet another way. European institutional change and 
European institutionalisation created a new market for consulting businesses in 
the last 20 years.6 Incidentally, many of the small start up consulting companies 
have been taken over by the big consulting firms. 
Paul Adamson was one of the pioneers in 1981 of what was to become a 
specialised branch of the consulting business. European public affairs (PA) - 
consultancies such as Adamson were start - ups in the early 1980s when the 
attempt to create the single market introduced large scale institutional change 
and reorganisation with many companies eager to learn more about the Euro-
pean institutions. For about 15 years, European PA consultancies remained 
small specialised businesses mostly hired to do monitoring for companies or 
associations and to give specific advice on European institutions. The some-
what arcane character of European procedures and the difficulties in obtaining 
significant information generated the market for specialised consultancies. In 
the past five years, much has changed in the European PA consulting business. 
Almost all the leading independent specialists have been taken over by big con-
sultancy firms due to the changing characteristics and requirements in Euro-
pean PA consulting. Adamson, known to be a specialist on European Parlia-
ment lobbying, has been taken over by the international consulting group BSMG 
adding Public Affairs and Association Management to the range of their ser-
vices. 
Thus, looking exclusively at associations in the case of business consultan-
cies, finding a predominance of national market conditions and dismissing the 
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influence of single big firms (Greenwood, 1998) may misrepresent business in-
fluence at the European level. In fact, single large companies may have more 
economical and political cloud than traditional national associations, and Euro-
pean federations of national associations. A lack of institutionalised regulation of 
the national market can hardly account for domestic predominance.7 Research 
on European interest representation could benefit strongly if the focus on asso-
ciations would be complemented by a research perspective centred on com-
plementary or competing activities of single firms. Vice versa, European institu-
tional impact on professional organisations is likely to be mitigated more by 
association involvement in the future due to the success of the European acti-
vating state in sidelining national private interest governments (with legal and 
medical service professions already proofing capable in obtaining derogations 
at the supranational level). 
Increasing efforts of both large consultancies and consultancy associations 
to be more involved in the European arenas affecting the demand side of con-
sulting expresses the desire to create supranational network governance 
regimes by an industry currently displaying a weak regulatory state regime of 
governance at the supranational level. 
3 Conclusions: Supranational Institutional Arrangements, 
Regulatory Intensities, and Industry Structures 
The transformation of European governance from multi-domestic forms to 
supranational multi-level politics has been found to have a significant impact on 
business associations and organisations in the service industries. Supranational 
arenas and institutional arrangements are solidly entrenched factors of in-
fluence since European institutional actors activated the supranational proto-
state, or state in formation. Supranational network governance, however, is not 
necessarily an attempt to peacefully integrate all interests. Frequently the 
Commission attempts to pit groups against each other or manages to com-
pletely sideline private interest groups (national professional associations). 
Consulting services are rather marginally subject to European regulation 
and thence to bargaining at the European level due to the low institutionalised 
regulatory impact on the core consulting markets, mainly. Indirectly, however, 
European governance (in consulting related professional services such as ac-
counting, and wider demand areas for consulting services) matters a lot, and 
has resulted in quite specific contextual rationalities of lobbying for SMEs and 
large consulting companies likely to transform the boundaries of professional 
services in Europe’s common market. Furthermore, consulting companies are 
affected by horizontal regulatory politics as any other business. Significant 
fragmentation can be observed with regard to institutional impact on business 
service organisations due to the mode of European market-making.  
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Concerning professional (business) services, they may be wrongly con-
sidered to be far behind with regard to Europeanisation processes observed in 
other industries (Greenwood, 1998). As a main reason for the reluctance to 
move to Brussels Greenwood cites the dominance of local (national) market 
characteristics companies have to tackle. A closer look reveals the need for a 
somewhat modified explanation involving a differentiated consideration of indi-
vidual professions (or would be professions) (see Lovecy, 1999) and of different 
groups of organisations as we have argued based on the case of business con-
sultancies. The aggregate look at „the professions“ and at umbrella business 
associations can be misleading due to the great variety of organisations in busi-
ness services. 
 
Notes 
*  The concept of this paper was elaborated together with Dieter Plehwe in an attempt to put 
the politico-economic developments in the transport industry and in business consultancy 
into a comparative perspective. Financial support of the German Research Foundation 
(DFG) for the study of the consultancy industry is gratefully acknowledged. 
1  Further instruments such as Commission communications and recommendations do not 
have binding character and constitute the wide and ambiguous field of soft law which, 
however, is also found to have rather more impact than might be suspected due to 
intensified multinational discourse and co-operation ahead of issuance (Cini, 2001). 
2 For further details, particularly concerning the new regime of network governance, see 
Kohler-Koch/Eising, 1999. 
3 The health related services and the legal professions succeeded in establishing specific 
regulations at the European level, too, notwithstanding the EC’s horizontal approach 
sketched above thereby extending the national interest government regime to the 
supranational level (Lovecy, 1999). Expansion strategies of consulting companies may be 
considered easier now into the field of accounting as compared to continued protection for 
legal services. 
4 On the U.S. side, associations are not part of that process. 
5 http://www-feaco.org/brochure_activities.html (download 15.12.00). 
6 Information in this section is largely based on an interview with a PA consultant in Brussels 
in spring 2001. 
7 It would rather be interesting to examine in future research, whether the General Service 
Directive applies for accounting services (and not for legal services) is partly due to the 
influence of large global consulting firms firmly involved in the accounting industry, and less 
well positioned by own activities to make a strong presence felt in legal services. 
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